Ebola Vaccines, Evidentiary Charisma and the Rise of Global Health Emergency Research by Kelly, Ann Horton
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1080/03085147.2018.1448557
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Kelly, A. H. (2018). Ebola Vaccines, Evidentiary Charisma and the Rise of Global Health Emergency Research.
Economy & Society. DOI: 10.1080/03085147.2018.1448557
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 02. Aug. 2018
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=reso20
Economy and Society
ISSN: 0308-5147 (Print) 1469-5766 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/reso20
Ebola vaccines, evidentiary charisma and the rise
of global health emergency research
Ann H. Kelly
To cite this article: Ann H. Kelly (2018) Ebola vaccines, evidentiary charisma and the
rise of global health emergency research, Economy and Society, 47:1, 135-161, DOI:
10.1080/03085147.2018.1448557
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/03085147.2018.1448557
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 11 Apr 2018.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 465
View Crossmark data
Ebola vaccines, evidentiary
charisma and the rise of
global health emergency
research
Ann H. Kelly
Abstract
The 2013–2016 West African Ebola outbreak was both a catastrophic public
health disaster and a rare research opportunity. This paper analyses how the ten-
sions between the humanitarian imperatives of disease control and the epistemic
conventions of bioscientific inquiry played out in the accelerated development,
testing and licensure of Ebola vaccines. Beginning with the epidemiological pro-
jections of the disease’s spread, the paper develops the notion of evidentiary char-
isma to capture the power of experimental designs and data packages to marshal
public health salience, recruit moral legitimacy and short-circuit scientific con-
testation. Attention to the charismatic dimensions of Ebola vaccine R&D helps
to unpick the simultaneous appeals to exception and convention in the unfolding
of a global health crisis, and to trace the normative and technical contours of the
emerging paradigm of emergency research.
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epidemiological models; charisma.
Copyright © 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UKLimited,
trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/),
which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduc-
tion in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited,
and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
Ann H. Kelly, Department of Global Health and Social Medicine, Faculty of Social Sciences
& Public Policy, School of Global Affairs, King’s College London, Strand Campus, London,
WC2R 2LS, United Kingdom. E-mail: ann.kelly@kcl.ac.uk
Economy and Society Volume 47 Number 1 February 2018: 135–161
https://doi.org/10.1080/03085147.2018.1448557
Introduction
Accounts of the 2013–2016 West African Ebola outbreak tend to share a lead: the
epidemic, we are told, was unprecedented. Formerly only known to afflict rural
populations within the Congo and Nile basins, through a ‘perfect storm’ of
socio-political, environmental and epidemiological factors the outbreak became a
bona fide global health emergency (Fauci, 2015; Piot, 2014; see also Boozary
et al., 2014). From Guinea’s Forest Region, the disease spilled across borders
and boarded planes, cropping up in urban areas without identifiable transmission
chains. The failure to trace and contain infection devastated local health systems,
strained humanitarian capacity and exposed the limits of global health governance.
An ‘epidemic of fear’, the outbreak’s political reverberations spoke to the evocative
power of Ebola as meme – a virality disproportionate to the contagious potential of
the virus (see Hofman & Au, 2017). ‘This Ebola event is different’, Margaret
Chan, the then Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO), con-
ceded at the epidemic’s peak. ‘Very different. This is likely the greatest peacetime
challenge that the United Nations and its agencies have ever faced’ (Chan, 2014).
The extraordinary nature of the West African Ebola outbreak and the interven-
tions that exceptionality set in motion have been focal points of social scientific cri-
tique (e.g. Benton &Dionne, 2015; Evans, 2016; Lakoff, 2015a; Nguyen, 2014; De
Waal, 2014). In particular, this scholarship has spotlighted the geopolitical stakes
involved in the epidemic’s transit from public health crisis to international emer-
gency. The high case mortality rate associated with Ebola suggests that regardless
of size, any outbreak will be considered a serious disease event. Over the past 20
years, the public health challenges these events pose have been met by Médecins
Sans Frontières (MSF; Doctors without Borders). MSF’s blend of medical exper-
tise and logistical efficiency has made the organization the de facto responders to
deadly outbreaks of this kind (Redfield, 2013). But when the West African epi-
demic spread beyond the technical means of non-governmental medical humani-
tarianism, MSF broke with its core commitment to political autonomy and called
upon the international community to deploy their respective armed forces.1 The
UN Security Council responded to this appeal with an equally unparalleled res-
olution urging member states to provide expertise, resources and supplies to
the region. Unanimously supported by the General Assembly – a historic 131-
country consensus – the resolution also encouraged theWHO, national and multi-
lateral organizations to facilitate the accelerated development of experimental
therapies, diagnostics and vaccines. In the days that followed, the UN established
its first-ever emergency health mission, UNMEER (UN Mission for Emergency
Ebola Response), to implement and coordinate those efforts under the leadership
of the WHO (United Nations, 2014).
The diversity of actors, agencies and resources brought into alignment to
contain the West African outbreak clearly constituted a departure from the
business of global health as usual. However, despite its scale and operational
complexity, the Ebola Response was guided by the bureaucratic mechanisms
and political priorities that have come to characterize contemporary global
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health governance (see Caremel et al., 2017; Lakoff, 2010). The militarized roll-
out of containment measures, the ratcheting up of data surveillance systems and
point-of-transit screening protocols, the emphases on risk communication and
pharmaceutical solutions are the classic strategies of sovereign nation-states,
preventing cross-border contagion while minimizing disruptions to global
traffic and trade (e.g. Leach, 2015; Roemer-Mahler & Elbe, 2016; De Waal,
2014; see also Fassin & Pandolfi, 2010). While epidemiologically unprece-
dented, a large-scale Ebola outbreak had been anticipated by International
Health Regulations under the terms of reference for a ‘Public Health Emer-
gency of International Concern’ (PHEIC):
a situation that is serious, unusual or unexpected; carries implications for public
health beyond the affected State’s national border; and may require immediate
international action. (WHO, 2008 [2005], p. 9)
The declaration of a PHEIC is an inflection point in global health practice,
marking the transformation of a public health issue into a security threat (see
Collier & Lakoff, 2008; Cooper, 2006; Fidler & Gostin, 2006; Lakoff, 2017).
But it also signals an epistemic shift: by definition both serious and unusual,
the anomalous occurrence of the PHEIC complicates global health intervention
by calling into question the forms of expert knowledge upon which conventional
disease control measures rely. Epidemiological trends and incidences, the his-
torical mortality and morbidity of an infection, risk-based calculations and
cost–benefit analyses are ill-suited to managing a catastrophic epidemic singu-
larity. ‘Black Swan events’ demand speculative and creative modes of global
health attention, such as simulation exercises and viral forecasting techniques –
what prominent infectious disease control expert Michael Osterholm describes
as ‘a forward thinking, which is ultimately aimed at securing our collective
future’ (Osterholm et al., 2015; see also, Caduff, 2015; Lachenal, 2014).
The incongruities between these styles of reasoning are critical to under-
standing why this Ebola event was, in Chan’s words, so very different. The
West African outbreak was classified as a PHEIC on 8 August 2014 – nearly
five months after the first laboratory-confirmed case. Widely condemned,
that lag time has prompted considerable self-reflection by the global health com-
munity. A series of expert-led reviews of the outbreak response have pointed to
the WHO’s dependence on the financial support and political will of member
states as one of the key stumbling blocks to the rapid decision-making and
coordination needed to avert the disaster (WHO, 2016a; see also Piot et al.,
2017).2 But while the efficacy of the Ebola response was undoubtedly ham-
strung by what MSF described as a ‘vacuum of leadership’ (MSF, 2015,
p. 6), the WHO’s early failure to recognize the situation unfolding in West
Africa as extraordinary speaks of a more conceptual set of constraints. Just
days after cases were first identified, the WHO deployed a team that assessed
the situation as challenging in its scope, but imminently controllable through
conventional public health methods, such as surveillance, contact tracing and
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community engagement.3 That confidence – or, according to some, compla-
cency – obscured the outbreak’s pandemic potential, mistaking what was
truly different about its spread for what was merely difficult. The WHO’s inac-
tion was, thus, as much a failure of leadership as of imagination: an inability to
envision crisis before its consequences became all too real (see Lakoff, 2016).
This paper begins at the point when the imaginary of an unprecedented event
took hold. Once declared a PHEIC, the West African Ebola outbreak ushered in
a new set of investigative priorities and protocols, guided by ‘a moral obligation
to learn as much as possible as quickly as possible’ (WHO, 2016b, p. 30). My
primary interest lies with the forms of fact-making that emerged under these
conditions of acceleration. Reworking the Ebola outbreak into an object of
knowledge and a platform for innovation involved developing new norms and
standards of research practice that could effectively square the demands of
investigative integrity with those of emergency humanitarian action. These
styles of evidence form the basis of the WHO’s (2016c) R&D blueprint for
action to prevent epidemics and constitute one of the most significant global
health legacies of the West African crisis.
The paper proceeds in five parts. The first section explores the epidemiolo-
gical models through which the emergency took shape. Drawing from Andrew
Lakoff’s (2016) analysis of the actuarial and sentinel logics that underwrite
disease threat management, I explore how the ‘hockey-stick graph’ – an
iconic figure of exponential growth – brought together the calculative and the
speculative dimensions of pandemic preparedness and, in so doing, precipitated
an exceptional international response. While these projections quickly proved to
be wildly inaccurate, the sense of urgency the hockey-stick conveyed trans-
formed Ebola’s value as an object of, and resource for, global health investment.
In the section that follows, I elaborate the hockey-stick’s evocative power in
terms of its evidentiary charisma. Charisma has provided a useful heuristic to
unpick the logics of global health prioritization, helping to explain, for instance,
the failure of some diseases to generate concern (Herrick, 2017) or the prophetic
power of scientists to bring others into focus (Caduff, 2014, 2015). These elab-
orations of global health charisma clarify the vicissitudes of attention and neglect
at work in the Ebola outbreak. The temporal structures of charismatic authority
provide the necessary conceptual groundwork for the subsequent section, which
lays out the moral and affective architecture of experimental vaccine research
under the auspices of the response.
Sections four and five consider how those collective concerns were brought to
bear on the accelerated development, testing and licensure of Ebola vaccines.
Experimental vaccination, promising to both alleviate present suffering and
pre-empt future disaster, provides an acute insight into the evidentiary practices
of global health R&D. The WHO’s involvement in the fast-track development
and testing of an Ebola vaccine candidate in Guinea was one of the organization’s
greatest achievements during the response. Ebola vaccine trials have now become
a reference point for the evidentiary needs, data sharing protocols and regulatory
adjustments necessary for research in the context of global health emergencies.
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My analysis is informed by experiences of working within various research
contexts during the outbreak. Serving on the scientific advisory boards for differ-
ent experimental Ebola therapeutics provided an overview of the challenges
designing emergency research posed, and allowed me to observe through what
moral, technical and political means those challenges were met. Conducting
anthropological research in Guinea and Sierra Leone into the impact of the
response on local health infrastructures clarified some of the tensions between
these ‘higher-level’ decision-making processes and the priorities of local research-
ers in these countries. These sets of insights are anchored by my work as a
member of the WHO’s Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE) on Ebola
Vaccines and Vaccinations. In my capacity as a member of SAGE, I was involved
in reviewing available data on the safety and efficacy of different vaccine candi-
dates and in drafting recommendations for future immunization. Much of this
work revolved around discussions over what kind of evidence would be sufficient
to counter the uncertainties attendant to investigations undertaken in a crisis situ-
ation. This paper argues that these emerging styles of evidentiary persuasion are
key to understanding the shifting trajectories of the global health project.4
The hockey-stick
At the end of September 2014, on the heels of the UN’s Ebola Emergency
Response directive, the WHO convened a two-day meeting to hasten the
testing and licensure of Ebola vaccines. Near the end of the second day,
Margaret Chan made an unexpected appearance. She began by commenting
on the diversity of the assembled expertise: ‘this is one of the very few
times’, Chan noted, ‘I go into a room that I know fewer than 10 people’.
While encouraged by the presence of fresh faces, she lamented the continuing
lack of robust international engagement – an indication that the urgency of the
situation had not been fully grasped:
In a humane world nobody should accept what has happened in West Africa.
This is history in the making, with the number of cases, yes – but the shape
of the curve is what matters, not the number. The hockey-stick curve is really
very worrying… this must be a moment for the international community to
come together. We must work at breakneck pace.5
Sometime in early August, the extraordinary nature of the Ebola outbreak had
taken shape, and that shape was a hockey-stick (Figure 1). The hockey-stick
curve describes a transition from incremental to exponential growth – a
figure that to this audience was shorthand for an epidemic out of control.6 At
the time of the meeting, 6,553 cases of Ebola had been reported and the situation
looked bleak. Epidemiological analyses showed that the outbreak was doubling
roughly every two to three weeks – a trend which, if continued, would devastate
the region and threaten populations across the globe. The WHO’s Response
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Team estimated case numbers could exceed 20,000 by the end of November
(WHO Response Team, 2014; see also Chowell et al., 2007). Extrapolating
infection rates further ahead, the United States’ Centers of Disease Control
(CDC) projected numbers in West Africa to reach upwards of 1.4 million by
mid-January (Meltzer et al., 2014).
The exponential growth in case numbers was, needless to say, alarming. But
it was the curve’s inflection point that granted these epidemiological projections
their truly terrifying proportions. Throughout the spring, the epidemic had
developed along the lines of previous Ebola outbreaks, spiking at around 100
cases, then gradually decreasing as control measures were implemented. What
happened during the summer months is unclear. Situation reports of the out-
break only began to appear on the WHO website in late August. Compiled
from national databases at irregular intervals, this information was difficult to
work with both from an analytical and, owing to its PDF format, practical per-
spective (see Althaus, 2016). It was only after Caitlin Rivers, then a graduate
student at Virginia Tech University, hand-digitized the WHO’s counts of
cumulative case numbers that the epidemic’s transmission dynamics became
amenable to analysis (Rivers et al., 2014).7 The initial analyses diverged con-
siderably, all projecting exponential growth, but within a wide range. The
reason for this discrepancy had to do with a lack of confidence in the collected
epidemiological figures. Models of future mortality rates were recalibrated to
account for ‘underreporting’ – a euphemism for the combined challenges of a
weak public health system and a hostile population (e.g. Chretien et al.,
2015). The heuristic significance of unreported cases is addressed in the
Figure 1 Combined epidemiological curves of West African Ebola virus disease cases
(WHO Response Team, 2014, p. 1486)
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opening paragraph of the WHO Ebola Response Team’s first detailed analysis
of the outbreak:
The true numbers of cases and deaths are certainly higher. There are numerous
reports of symptomatic persons evading diagnosis and treatment, of laboratory
diagnoses that have not been included in national databases, and of persons
with suspected EVD [Ebola Virus Disease] who were buried without a diagnosis
having been made. (WHO Response Team, 2014, p. 1481)
In other words, the presumed inadequacies of data were integrated into epide-
miological analyses in a way that amplified assumptions about the scale of the
outbreak. The CDC’s forecasts, to take one example, compared the difference
between reported cases and expert estimates of the numbers of beds in use to
derive a ‘correction factor’ of 2.5 which, when multiplied by initial estimates,
produced the predicted figure of 21,000 cases by the end of September.
Considering how the incompleteness of epidemiological data was handled at
the start of the epidemic, these models of the epidemic’s hidden magnitude are
striking. At the WHO’s first Ebola press conference in April 2014, Doctor
Stéphane Hugonnet emphasized the importance of looking beyond the case
counts in understanding the epidemic’s trajectory:
We should not focus too much on the figures and the numbers because this
changes every day – a patient arrives, is suspect, then he’s investigated and
then he might be discarded or confirmed and so the number changes every
day. I think most important is the trends and the geographical spread of the
infection. (WHO, 2014a)
At this point in the epidemic, those trends suggested an international out-
break and a serious one, but not a global health emergency. Rising case
numbers were contextualized by previous Ebola outbreaks – what Lakoff
terms an ‘actuarial logic’ built upon the assumption that ‘possible threats
to collective life can be known through careful demographic and epidemiolo-
gical research’ (Lakoff, 2015b, p. 45). The outbreak’s inflection point – its
shift from ‘blade’ to ‘stick’ – attenuated the explanatory power of historical
statistics and foregrounded instead the hypothetical outbreak projections.
Analyses of Ebola’s basic reproductive number (R0) are indicative. Reports
suggested that, despite the alarming increase in numbers, the strain wreaking
havoc in West Africa was infecting people at the known rate – an R0 that in
the grand scheme of infectious disease is relatively low.8 That a mutation in
the Ebola virus was not behind the outbreak’s magnitude did little to assuage
fears of its catastrophic potential. In a press release titled ‘Why the Ebola
outbreak has been underestimated’, the WHO described the existence of
‘numerous shadow-zones’ where Ebola cases ‘cannot be investigated
because of community resistance’ (WHO, 2014c). Underreporting or mis-
diagnoses were just the tip of the iceberg: populations were hiding bodies,
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looting treatment units and attacking surveillance teams. Social life was
emerging in a way that was almost as threatening as its viral counterpart.
What was needed, the report suggested, was ‘to produce more realistic
estimates and thus communicate the true magnitude of needs’.9
The hockey-stick curve produced that sense of realism. Like other ‘sentinel
devices’ that Lakoff associates with the contemporary biosecurity concern with
‘the sudden and unpredictable’, adjustments for ‘underreporting’ captured the
apocalyptic potential of what had previously been regarded as a controllable
virus. The hockey-stick graph provided the necessary proof that this outbreak
was, in fact, an extraordinary event and was thus able ‘to stimulate action when
decision is imperative but knowledge is incomplete’ (Lakoff, 2015b, p. 45).
While rather late in the day for West African populations, ‘the models’, accord-
ing to Caitlin Rivers, ‘helped to inspire and inform the strong international
response’ (Rivers, 2014, p. 492).
As spurs for global health attention, the models were effective; as guides for
public health action, however, they were less so. Empty beds in newly built
treatment units testified to the gross disparity between the modellers’ predic-
tions and the situation on the ground (see Owada et al., 2016). From October
into Christmas, case numbers declined across the region, and precipitously in
Liberia. The WHO initially warned against false optimism – ‘it’s like saying
your pet tiger is under control’, commented Bruce Aylward, WHO Assistant
Director-General in charge of operational response.10 But while a ‘shadow epi-
demic’ remained within the realm of possibility, as case numbers continued to
plateau across the region, dire admonitions began to seem more precautionary
than prognostic. Up to this point, the unreliability of epidemiological data
had been regarded as a key handicap to containment. Now, questions were
raised about the accuracy of mathematical modelling and, more broadly, the
value of such predictions in guiding public health interventions (Butler, 2014;
cf. McGoey, 2012).
Modellers defended their calculations as representing a worst-case scenario.
Neil Ferguson, epidemiologist at the WHO Ebola Response, emphasized the
model’s pragmatic potential, as an instrument ‘to wake up the world and say
that this could be really bad if we don’t do anything’ (The Economist, 2015).
Martin Meltzer, senior CDC epidemiologist, made a similar point: ‘We were
telling policy makers that if we don’t do something, this is what will happen
… we needed them to know that we could see millions of people infected
with Ebola’ (Yasmin, 2014). By refocusing international attention, the
hockey-stick curve conveyed that vision and arguably had ensured that the
Ebola doomsday did not come to pass.
The next section elaborates the hockey-stick graph’s revelatory capacities and
persuasive power. A notion of evidentiary charisma helps to unpick the truth
this visual analogue of exponential growth disclosed about the unfolding
Ebola outbreak. The moral outrage and collective responsibility unleashed by
this charismatic reworking of the outbreak sets the stage for the significance
of experimental Ebola vaccines to the response.
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The power of epidemiological signs
Reflecting on recent experiences in Botswana researching alcohol consumption,
Clare Herrick (2017) describes the frenzied response to the Ebola outbreak
occurring over 3,000 miles away. It was a degree of public concern and political
mobilization that alcohol abuse has yet to receive despite its profound public
health consequences. Herrick attributes that disjuncture between perceptions
of public health risk and evidence of disease burden to a ‘charismatic gap’
(Herrick, 2017, p. 105). Extending Max Weber’s ideas about styles of political
authority to the processes of global health prioritization, she argues that non-
communicable diseases (NCDs), like alcoholism, lack the exceptionality that
‘incites affective responses such as fear, anxiety, awe or disgust’ (Herrick,
2017, p. 112). NCDs, she argues, are a rational abstraction; the term ambigu-
ously designates a diversity of conditions that require complex and long-term
interventions. Without expressive lexicon or vivid iconography, NCDs exist
almost exclusively in metrics. Global health attention, Herrick argues, is not a
measure of the breadth of scientific evidence but rather of the intensity of ‘col-
lective distress’ (Herrick, 2017, p. 113). Only diseases that convey an acute sense
of threat or empathy can garner public concern and precipitate political action.
Circumscribed to the tedium of incidence and prevalence, NCDs fail to engage
popular imagination and persist as so-called ‘neglected epidemics’.
Herrick’s use of charisma to elucidate the tensions between medical actuality
and global health salience is instructive. The kinds of attention the Ebola out-
break did – and, crucially, did not – receive had more to do with the virus’
mythic countenance than with the epidemic’s epidemiological realities. Charac-
terized by bleeding from the pores and eyes, Ebola’s sheer virulence is, to quote
Herrick, ‘devastatingly charismatic’ (Herrick, 2017, p. 100). Its obscure origins
in African ecologies are archetypical of the ‘outbreak narrative’ that drive biose-
curity agendas and marry pathogenic ‘emergence’ to catastrophic terrorism
(Wald, 2007; see also Bonwitt et al., 2018; Brown & Kelly, 2014; Cooper,
2006; Lynteris, 2016). Ebola possesses what Jamie Lorimer (2007) helpfully
terms a ‘negative aesthetic charisma’ – a monstrous alterity that triggers a col-
lective sense of aversion rather than one of distress (Lorimer, 2007, p. 919).
Further torqued by racism and antiquated notions of cultural difference,
West Africans were largely blamed for their role in spreading the infection.
Even at the height of media attention, their suffering remained occluded by
the sensationalism of backward practices and ‘shadow-zones’ of resistance
(see Honigsbaum, 2017; Kelly & Mari-Saez, in press; Nuñes, 2016). Set
squarely within the conventions of horror, Ebola’s discursive foundations fore-
closed genuine empathy with the infected.
These affective dynamics of fear, disgust, hysteria and shame found their
statistical legitimation in the hockey-stick. As a ‘worst-case scenario’, the
hockey-stick belongs to the register of ‘pandemic prophesy’, a designation
Carlo Caduff (2015) gives to scientific claims made in the name of public
health preparedness. Less data-driven than ‘scientifically inspired’, the
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authority of a catastrophic forecast, Caduff argues, rests not in the accuracy of
its model, but in the resonance of its prognosis (Caduff, 2015, p. 5). Proclama-
tions of the coming plague capture the eschatological structures of feeling that
predominate in times of radical uncertainty (see also Stewart & Harding, 1999).
The hockey-stick’s dramatic and seemingly irreversible sweep keyed into
popular notions of Ebola as the world-ending ‘Andromeda strain’. The data
alone were possibly misleading. Statistical adjustments were required to
capture the catastrophic reality of the situation (Figure 2).
But there is more to the persuasive power of epidemiological forecasts than
their latent millenarianism. For the public health professionals and infectious
disease microbiologists that Caduff describes, uncertainty is the epistemic base-
line. People travel, viruses mutate, experiments fail. An emphasis on prepared-
ness thus reflects ‘a natural evolution that is always ahead of the curve and a
scientific understanding that is always behind’ (Caduff, 2014, p. 302). It is this
‘temporal disjuncture’ between incomplete knowledge and unintelligible
object, Caduff argues, that gives scientific prophesies of the coming pandemic
their political purchase. In a post-Rumsfeld policy climate, invoking
‘unknown unknowns’ creates a framework of justification for pre-emptive inter-
ventions. The imminence and inscrutability of risk, in other words, creates the
space for political action. It ‘enables actors to commit a leap of faith’, Caduff
writes. ‘It allows them to have trust in a particular kind of future, even if
there is no evidence that this future is likely to materialise’ (Caduff, 2014, p. 302).
There are few figures that communicate temporal disjuncture more power-
fully than those depicting exponential growth. In the context of an outbreak,
the exponential curve inscribes an alarming acceleration – with every new
Figure 2 Projected outbreak acceleration, M.S. Majumder for HealthMap/Boston
Children’s Hospital, 30th September 2014, with permission.
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case, the outbreak becomes harder to control, its pace a feature of its own scale
(Kelly, 2015). Once the rate of Ebola infections was described as advancing
exponentially, experts began to question the adequacy of conventional outbreak
control techniques to slow transmission. The hockey-stick played out that game
of catch-up to its logical conclusion, projecting a future haunted by the spectre
of hesitation and delay.
But the belatedness the hockey-stick communicates also has a specific ante-
cedent, a history of catastrophic projection that complicates the degree of
faith it commands. The hockey-stick graph is a statistical artefact of climatology.
The term was coined to describe a model produced by Michael Mann,
Raymond Bradley and Malcolm Hughes in their 1998 paper on global tempera-
ture fluctuations over the past millennium. Their graph, reproduced in the
Third Assessment Report of the United Nation’s Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), synthesized highly diverse archival, meteorological
and palaeoclimatological data sets. Their analysis showed the dramatic impact
of industrial activity on the climate (Figure 3).
Arguably one of the most contentious graphs in the history of science, the
hockey-stick precipitated bitter debates in academic and popular media,
leading to professional misconduct hearings and, ultimately, citizen science pro-
jects devoted to auditing the validity of climate models (Edwards, 2010). In par-
ticular, the dissonance between the spatial and temporal complexity of the data
and the certainty conveyed by the long blue ‘blade’ and vertical red ‘stick’
Figure 3 The Mann et al. (1999) ‘hockey stick’ graph recording the average annual
temperature in the northern hemisphere since 1000 A.D. The graph was subsequently
published as figure 2.20 in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Third
Assessment Report (2001). Printed with permission.
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invited scepticism and inspired mistrust (Walsh, 2015). Rather than a smoking
gun for anthropogenic climate change, the graph became to some a symbol for
politically motivated data manipulation and an obstacle for policy deliberation.
Refocusing debate on the technical nuances of how to account for environ-
mental changes, the hockey-stick effectively forestalled a more pragmatic dis-
cussion over how best to mitigate them (Demeritt, 2006).
The epidemiological afterlife of the hockey-stick controversy resonates in the
Ebola outbreak response. Following the rapid decline of the epidemic, accusa-
tions of statistical overestimation echoed perennial climate change controversies
over the hypothetical assumptions built into models (see Lahsen, 2005). But
when Margaret Chan drew attention to the hockey-stick curve, her concern
was not scientific accuracy but rather international engagement. At this
moment, the hockey-stick articulated both the exceptional nature of the out-
break – ‘history in the making’ – and the dangers of binding political action
to the accuracy of scientific claims. A more measured approach could lead the
global health community to sleepwalk into a public health catastrophe. The
hockey-stick demanded a suspension of disbelief, an imaginative leap into the
pandemic future. That leap, moreover, had a moral propulsion. The role inter-
national inaction played in the scale of the outbreak – to say nothing of the
decades of entrenched regional impoverishment and systematic geopolitical
neglect – suggested that the situation in West Africa was not only dire but, to
quote Chan, ‘inhumane’. The hockey-stick played into this sense of the disaster
as something ‘manmade’ – as much an unexpected crisis as a reckoning for the
global health status quo (see Martin-Moreno et al., 2014).
For Herrick and Caduff, the arc of global health attention follows the tran-
sition of systematic epidemiological investigation ‘into the universe of the
unverifiable’ (Caduff, 2014, p. 313). The salience of certain diseases or the emi-
nence of scientific ‘prophets’ operates through the production of uncertainty,
mystery and enchantment – an unknowability that bestows power through col-
lective faith. Charisma is therefore a highly relational quality, hinging upon
popular deference and unconditional support. ‘It is a recognition’, writes
Weber,
on the part of those subject to authority which is decisive for the validity of char-
isma. This is freely given and guaranteed by what is held to be a ‘sign’ or proof,
originally always a miracle, and consists in devotion to the corresponding revel-
ation, hero worship or absolute trust in the leader. (Weber, 1968, p. 48)
This proof, Weber goes on to argue, is not the sum-total of the charismatic
leader’s power – genuine charisma, indicative of a gift of grace, cannot be
subject to any test. The validation of charismatic authority is better understood
as an iterative process – a perennial interplay and feedback between the actions of
the leader and the expectations of his followers. Demonstrations of charisma are
transformative events, bringing about ‘a completely new orientation of all atti-
tudes towards all forms of life and to the “world” in general’ (Weber, 1968,
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p. 142). While that reorientation suggests a radical break from social convention,
charisma ultimately appeals to pre-existing beliefs and convictions: it is, to quote
Clifford Geertz, ‘an abiding, if combustible, aspect of social life that occasionally
bursts into open flame’ (Geertz, 1977, p. 151). Thus the proof, whether a heroic
deed or miracle, does not merely validate an individual’s capacities to lead but
rather links his or her mission to gathering social momentum (see Turner,
1996). Interpreted through enthusiasm, despair and hope, the proof provides
a framework through which to interpret crisis, a transcendent truth that gives
meaning to the dread of everyday life (Weber, 1968, p. 49).
Extending charisma from the qualities of an individual leader to the forms of
authority that arise from an extraordinary situation, the hockey-stick’s power as
an instrument of revelation becomes apparent (see Hansen & Verkaaik, 2009).
The hockey-stick validates and amplifies an understanding of the Ebola out-
break’s existential significance as both a global health and a moral crisis, creating
a symbolic anchor for the response. Its curve, the syntax for apocalyptic
anxieties, provided a centre of gravity around which solidarity could form – a
sense of purpose and collective duty to a moral cause.
The promise of vaccines
That collective sentiment was buoyed by hope: an apocalyptic forecast found its
redemption in the promise of an Ebola vaccine. There were practical reasons
why vaccines were regarded as a research priority. The discomfort and
dangers of wearing biosafety equipment, the virulence of the disease and the dif-
ficulty of conducting research on mortally ill patients suggested that a vaccine
could make public health headway where a therapeutic treatment could not
(Kanapathipillai et al., 2014). Moreover, with such high transmission in the
communities, many experts believed that a vaccine was the only clinical inter-
vention that would not be overrun by the number of new infections (e.g.
Flynn & Bartunek, 2014; Whitty et al., 2014). An effective Ebola vaccine also
appealed to a profound faith in the powers of public health. The paradigmatic
example of biomedical triumphalism, a vaccine offered a way to make up for lost
time, a ‘magic bullet’ to halt the current outbreak and provide a permanent sol-
ution for those yet to come (cf. Ehrenstein & Neyland, 2018; Nature, 2014).
By the time experts gathered in Geneva to discuss options for expediting
vaccine R&D in late September 2014, two candidates were at advanced stages
of preclinical development. As part of their expanded research portfolio in bio-
defence, the US National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID)
had engineered chAd3-EBOV, a vaccine derived from a non-replicating chim-
panzee adenovirus currently under development by GlaxoSmithKlein (GSK).
The second vaccine under discussion was the rVSV-ZEBOV. Based on a wea-
kened version of the vesicular stomatitis virus, this candidate had been created
by scientists working under the auspices of the Public Health Agency of Canada
and was licensed by Merck. Single doses of both vaccines had shown 100 per
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cent protection in non-human primates at four to five weeks and a strong
immune response in humans (Lambe et al., 2017). A number of other similarly
promising candidates, including those from Johnson & Johnson, the Chinese
company, CanSino, and Russia’s Gamaleya Center for Epidemiology and
Microbiology were in the pipeline. In the months to follow, a dozen candidate
vaccines would undergo rapid clinical development.
Introducing unproven interventions in the context of a public health emer-
gency is hugely problematic. In the early days of the outbreak, despite offers
from pharmaceutical representatives, vaccine trials were not considered appro-
priate.11 The uproar that followed the use of experimental therapies on US vol-
unteers while infected African health care professionals were denied access put
the possibility of conducting clinical trials during the outbreak back on the table
(see O’Dempsey, 2017). An expert panel convened by the WHO to provide gui-
dance on the use of experimental Ebola treatments, diagnostics and vaccines
argued that Ebola’s high mortality rate and transmission intensity compelled
a departure from conventional systems of medical regulation and governance.
Under these extraordinary circumstances, the committee deemed it acceptable
on both ethical and evidential grounds to use as potential treatments or for
prevention unregistered interventions that have shown promising results in
the laboratory and in animal models. Provided that certain conditions are met.
(WHO, 2014b, p. 1)
Those conditions reflected the ethical, scientific and operational considerations
of the potential risks of an investigational intervention and the specific demands
of the context of care (Rid & Emanuel, 2014). Because no treatment or vaccine
had undergone tests in humans, it was argued that their use could not be com-
passionate. Evidence first had to be generated before any moral claims could be
made for the right to access.
However, the processes involved in bringing a vaccine from preclinical
testing to development were ill-suited to meet the urgent demands of the
crisis. Systems of financing, ethical review and standards of evidence had to
be redesigned to bridge the exigencies of humanitarian disaster with the regu-
latory demands of a future vaccine stockpile. Clinical trials offered a point of
convergence for these demands. ‘Researchers have a moral duty’, the WHO’s
report concluded, ‘to evaluate these interventions in clinical trials that are of
the best possible design in the current exceptional circumstances of the West
African Ebola outbreak’ (WHO, 2014b, p. 7).
Urgent, historic designs
What constituted ‘the best possible’ design was the subject of fierce debate. Indi-
vidually randomized placebo-controlled, clinical trials (RCTs) are widely
regarded as the gold standard for medical evidence and a sine qua non for
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regulatory approval (e.g. Kelly & Geissler, 2011; Wahlberg & McGoey, 2007).
While there was a consensus that first-in-human trials on healthy volunteers
should be evaluated using an RCT design, the prospect of randomizing mortally
ill patients or, in the case of vaccines, highly vulnerable populations to a placebo
raised hackles. Holding firmly to the standard of the RCT some proponents
argued that experiments deviating from a rigorously blinded and randomized
design would risk producing inscrutable results and thus, ‘waste scarce interven-
tion-related resources, making them profoundly unethical’ (Lanini et al., 2015,
p. 738). A random schedule was the only way to control for the confounding
factors introduced by the complexity of the investigative context, and the lack
of knowledge about either the therapeutic products or Ebola’s clinical pathogen-
esis. In light of the scarcity of the experimental interventions, moreover, random
allocation would ensure distributive justice (e.g. Goodman, 2014).12
MSF, who did not take the decision to engage in clinical trials lightly, rejected
the use of the RCT designs as an inappropriate measure to evaluate Ebola inter-
ventions in the midst of an outbreak.13 The demand on front-line providers to
withhold potentially effective treatment or prophylaxis from patients and popu-
lations were felt to be too much to bear (Rid & Antierens, 2017). Academics and
practitioners echoed these concerns. Community relations were already precar-
iously fragile; an investigation that would be perceived as condemning some
individuals to death would risk fuelling resistance (see Adebamowo et al.,
2014; Sissoko et al., 2016). ‘Adaptive designs’ which emphasize real-time flexi-
bility provided a methodological alternative (Montgomery, 2017). The ‘stepped
wedge’ design, for instance, involves the vaccination of participants or groups of
participants in a sequence over an extended period of time. This staggered sche-
dule solved the problem of leaving vulnerable populations unprotected, as all
trial participants would be vaccinated, but just some before others. Analysing
data at multiple different ‘steps’ also gave investigators the opportunity to
stop the trial if the intervention proved to be ineffective (e.g. Piszczek &
Paltrow, 2015).
The design does, however, have some drawbacks. For one, it tends to take
longer to implement than an RCT, where comparisons are conducted in paral-
lel. The lag time between intervention and control groups – or the lack of ‘con-
current controls’ – can also introduce confounding factors. In the case of the
Ebola vaccine trials, investigators had to assume that the risk of infection was
the same for all groups across the period of the trial. There were ways to
adjust for that time effect, but they had implications for the statistical power
of the trials and, thus, on its sample size (Barker et al., 2016).
Like those catalysed by the hockey-stick, debates over trial design revolved
around the axis of time. The pace at which vaccine candidates had moved
from laboratory experiments on animals to large-scale studies in the human
population was breath-taking. But in the context of research on humans,
however, the value of research speed is articulated both in terms of timely
results and rapid access – priorities that can be difficult to align. The first
late-stage efficacy (Phase 2/3) vaccine trials showcased the stark differences
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in opinion on the degree to which methodological rigour could be sacrificed for
product availability. In Liberia, the US NIAID collaborated with the Liberian
Ministry of Health (MOH) to implement a three-arm, double-blind placebo-
controlled randomized trial. The trial’s sample size was set at 27,000 healthy
individuals, who would be randomized to one of the two vaccine candidates
or a placebo. Their health status would be followed over the course of a year.
In Sierra Leone, the CDC, the Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MOHS)
and the University of Sierra Leone implemented a trial aimed at 6,000 health
and frontline workers. Using a stepped-wedge design, participants were
assigned randomly to one of two time frames for vaccination with rVSV-
ZEBOV, either immediately or after six months.14
As soon as these trials began enrolment a different sense of urgency took hold.
The news that the epidemic had begun to plateau indicated to contributors to a
second high-level meeting for Ebola vaccines and financing in January 2015 that
the ‘window of opportunity to prove efficacy may be closing’ (WHO, 2015b,
p. 4). Relief that the outbreak was slowing was duly expressed. However, the
implications of this positive public health turn for scientific research were pro-
found. Pointed questions were raised about the likelihood of either trial being
able to generate any robust conclusions, and these concerns were soon borne
out. Ultimately both the Liberian and Sierra Leonean experiments were
unable to recruit the necessary numbers to evaluate vaccine efficacy and had
to be modified to focus on safety and immune response. While the terror of a
hypothetical tipping point may have provided its justification, research could
only be sustained by epidemiological actualities. Without the cases, vaccines
could not be tested nor their promise vindicated.
All, however, was not lost. Aware of what an effective vaccine might mean to
its population, the Guinean government approached the WHO to help coordi-
nate a third trial in the country. With the support of a number of academic and
charity partners – including theWellcome Trust, the UKDepartment for Inter-
national Development and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs – the
WHO initiated a vaccine trial called Ebola ça Suffit (Ebola, this is enough).
The trial used a ‘ring vaccination’ strategy, a new experimental design built
around infected individuals. After an Ebola case was diagnosed, the research
team made a list of all the people with whom the sick individual may have
come into contact – and the close contacts of those contacts – over the previous
three weeks (the maximum time it takes to contract the disease after exposure).
This high-risk group constituted a single ‘ring’. Each ring was then randomized
to receive the vaccine either immediately or after three weeks. In a fashion
similar to the stepped-wedge design, all those enrolled would eventually
receive the vaccine, but in this case after a much shorter period of time.
What was most striking about this design was how, by recruiting those at
highest risk of infection, it succeeded in maximizing the opportunities to
enrol participants, while essentially functioning as a targeted public health
measure. The experiment also carried with it a powerful legacy. The ‘ring vac-
cination’ design was adapted from a key infection control tool used in the
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eradication of smallpox, arguably the WHO’s greatest triumph: in just over a
decade, the mortality rate for the disease went from 2–3 million a year to
zero. The strategy of vaccinating populations at greatest risk – building herd
immunity through communal rings – provided a solution to the intractable
problem of vaccine shortage (Heymann, 2004), making the smallpox eradication
programme, according to the then Director-General of the WHO, Halfdan
Mahler, ‘a triumph of management not medicine’ (see Kamradt-Scott, 2015).
The WHO’s Ebola ça Suffit vaccine team was acutely aware of this history.
Presentations on the trial design, and later of its highly encouraging outcomes,
begin with a slide displaying the symbol of the smallpox eradication campaign
beside the terrifying image of a child, face covered with pustules, afflicted by
the disease. Conjuring those memories led to some criticism. According to
Annette Rid and Franklin Miller (2016), ‘the prevailing ethical confusion
about the trial design raises concern that its broad acceptance rests on false
beliefs and expectations’ (Rid & Miller, 2016, p. 432). Remarkably, however,
those expectations seem to have been met in this case. Among the 5,837
people who were vaccinated, none became infected with Ebola. For those in
the control group who did not receive vaccination, 23 cases were detected: a
reported efficacy of 100 per cent (Henao-Restrepo et al., 2017).
While stunning, these results demand some qualification, which the following
section will explore. Yet the fact that the roundly criticized WHO would be
responsible for producing a highly effective vaccine is a narrative that is difficult
to resist. ‘A lot of the lessons learnt and memories of the eradication of smallpox
played a role in designing how this was assessed’, Jeremy Farrar, the Director of
the Wellcome Trust, explained in an interview. There were reasons to be cau-
tious about the vaccine, but the investigative process – the coordination of part-
ners, the ingenious balance of robust science and humanitarian demands – was,
Farrar believed, a testament to the WHO’s import for global health. ‘History
rhymes’, he mused; ‘it does not always repeat itself, but it often rhymes’.15 In
a time of crisis and alleged institutional failure, Ebola ça Suffit galvanized
hope through a charismatic expression of a greater truth.
A preponderance of evidence
In initiating an accelerated programme of vaccine R&D, the WHO put forward
the principle of ‘pursuing all vaccines until they fail’ (WHO, 2014b). This com-
mitment was intended to serve as a bulwark against dramatic changes in the epi-
demic that might discourage pharmaceutical companies to continue investment.
Research, it was argued, must continue so that ‘fully licensed and approved vac-
cines [can be] stockpiled in readiness for the next Ebola outbreak’.16
The stockpile is currently being assembled. GAVI, the vaccine alliance, has
agreed to pay Merck $5 million towards the further development of rVSV-
ZEBOV, provided it secures regulatory approval.17 In addition to the 300,000
doses of the vaccine the company has made available for emergency use,
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Merck has submitted applications to the European Medicines Agency and the
US Food and Drug Administration and has received priority status ensuring
expedited review. Considering the 100 per cent efficacy shown in the Guinea
trial, the process towards licensure should be swift and straightforward.
Some questions about the significance of these results remain, however.
Despite the statistical power attributed to the focus on a high-risk population,
the trial enrolled relatively small numbers of participants. It was also conducted
at a late stage in the outbreak, so other forms of protection, associated with
increased public awareness, might have played some role in reducing infections.
Indeed, it is unclear to what extent those vaccinated had actually been exposed
to Ebola. Moreover, on average, more individuals were enrolled in clusters that
received the vaccine after three weeks, increasing the chances for Ebola infec-
tions to occur (Krause, 2015). Finally and crucially, in order to make the trial
acceptable to communities, the investigators did not take blood or other
samples. While antibody responses were explored in Phase 1 trials, there is a
lack of clarity on the immunological mechanisms conferring protection or
how long it might last (Lambe et al., 2017; Rechtien et al., 2017).
These gaps in the data could ultimately be filled by further clinical studies in
an emergency context, which licensure from the WHO’s Emergency Use
Assessment and Listing Procedure (EUAL) could provide. Following the
decision to allow for the testing of unproven interventions in the outbreak,
the WHO set up the EUAL to determine the ‘minimal level of information’
necessary to allow populations to gain access to a therapy in times of crisis.
This pathway involves synthesizing different forms of evidence: ‘If large scale
study results are not available, WHO will consider whether the preponderance
of evidence from the pre-clinical and early human studies and any other infor-
mation of which it is aware’ (WHO, 2015a, p. 4). The pathway resembles the
FDA’s Animal Efficacy Rule, which was introduced in the wake of the 9/11
attacks to approve biologics that could potentially prevent deadly conditions
for which human efficacy trials are neither feasible nor ethical. The Rule
allows for data from preclinical studies to be bridged with a robust safety and
toxicity profile and information on immune correlates.
The regulatory status of these evidentiary assemblages is set to become
increasingly relevant in light of the number of Ebola vaccines which have
advanced through clinical development but for which large-scale studies are
likely to be impossible. One of the consequences of the compelling results of
the ring vaccine trial is that experimenting with other vaccines in an outbreak
would be considered unethical. Designs that compare new interventions to
this vaccine may be proposed, but to generate conclusive results would
require an outbreak of a size that is unlikely to occur again. While in all likeli-
hood highly effective, the rVSV-ZEBOV is arguably inferior in many respects
to the other 12 candidates in development. The vaccine has stringent cold-chain
requirements – it must be kept at minus 80 degrees Celsius, while other candi-
dates are stable at higher temperatures. It is also only effective against the Zaire
strain of Ebola, whereas others are multivalent, providing protection against a
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range of relevant filoviruses. Finally, it has produced a significant number of
serious, if not severe, adverse reactions in the form of arthritis (Krause, 2015).
Ultimately the decision will lie with African regulatory agencies – a point
which was driven home during the most recent outbreak of Ebola in the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). When cases were confirmed, the WHO
and GAVI quickly began taking the necessary steps to offer the vaccine
under experimental conditions. However, despite that engagement the DRC
government did not submit a request for deployment. Three weeks into the out-
break, the government finally issued an authorization to conduct a ring vacci-
nation trial. Because no new cases emerged, however, the vaccine was never
shipped to the country. The delay received some criticism, but considering
the logistics of deploying the vaccine in the forested conditions of the Likati
health zone, the reasons were understandable (see Cohen, 2017). Moreover,
unlike West Africa, the DRC was familiar with the management of Ebola out-
breaks through measures that would not subject their populations to the risk
of an unproven vaccine or the anxieties brought on by an experimental trial.
The charismatic public health promise of the rVSV, so powerfully evidenced
by the ring vaccine trial, in this case, was simply not compelling enough.
Routine emergency
This paper has examined the cadence of evidence under emergency conditions.
It began by scrutinizing the role epidemiological uncertainties play in reframing
a familiar epidemic into an extraordinary event. Drawing from Weberian ana-
lyses of global health attention, I explored the integration of uncertainty and col-
lective sentiment into a mode of evidentiary charisma. Weber’s
conceptualization of charisma as a ‘revolutionary force’ that can compel individ-
uals into collective action helps illuminate the blending of rational, normative
and affective commitments that qualified traditional epidemiological models
and made the international community move. That movement, I suggest, was
oriented by the promise and expectation of an Ebola vaccine. The controversies
and conflicts around clinical trial design reflected the tensions between the force
of that orientation and the complex moral architecture of the outbreak response.
Ultimately, producing evidence of vaccine efficacy exposed the deep structures
of fear and desire that underline global health authority and the limitations of
that authority in the face of public health realities.
In his introduction to the 1968 edition of On charisma and institution building,
S.N. Eisenstadt argued that Weber’s analysis of the routinization of charisma
suggests that continuity and not disruption is key to its political power and
social relevance:
The true test of any great charismatic leader lies not in his ability to create a
single event or great movement, but also in his ability to leave a continuous
impact on an institutional structure – to transform any given institutional
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setting by infusing into it some of his charismatic vision, by investing the regular,
orderly offices, or some aspects of social organization, with some of its charis-
matic qualities and aura. (Eisenstadt, 1968, p. xxi)
Following the West African Ebola outbreak, a number of strong claims have
been made about the transformative impact of the response on global health.
Margaret Chan characterized vaccine research in particular as a ‘generational
opportunity’, which, regardless of the success of any single preventative or
therapeutic product, has succeeded in garnering the necessary political will to
reconfigure the mechanisms that govern global health R&D (WHO, 2015b).
A number of new initiatives have now been put in place to incentivize the dis-
covery of vaccines for pathogens that fail to gain the attention of the pharma-
ceutical industry, and the WHO has used the example of ring vaccination
trials to develop new norms and standards for research conducted during
health emergencies (Kieny, 2018). It remains to be seen, however, how these
norms and standards will be legitimized, and what forms of institutional and col-
lective action will materialize out of research conducted in times of emergency.
As the global health enterprise becomes increasingly oriented towards anticipat-
ing uncertain futures, it is critical that we confront the mechanisms through
which charismatic evidence emerges in contexts of crisis, and the processes
by which it infuses with seemingly irresistible authority the designs and inter-
ventions of powerful actors and institutions.
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Notes
1 In the past, MSF’s unequivocalness on the incompatibility between military inter-
ventions and humanitarian aid has been sacrosanct. The organization was therefore
emphatic that the role of military assets in Ebola-affected regions should be circum-
scribed to medical expertise, logistical support and supply and exclude strategies of
crowd control, quarantine and containment (see http://af.reuters.com/article/
topNews/idAFKBN0GX1QP20140902; see also Benton, 2017).
2 Those limitations are written into the organizational structure of the WHO, whose
technical and scientific experts tend to be located at headquarters in Geneva while auth-
ority to respond to outbreaks remains in the hands of regional offices (see Sprecher,
2017).
3 ‘We know very well how this virus is transmitted’, WHO Assistant Director-General
for Health Security, Keiji Fukuda, assured the audience at a press conference in Geneva
on 8 April 2014. ‘This is an infection for which… the risk of getting infected is low with
the right precautions’ (http://www.who.int/mediacentre/multimedia/Ebola_outbreak_
Guinea_transcript_08APR2014.pdf).
4 The data discussed in this paper is only that which is publicly available.
5 Fieldnotes, 30 September 2014, WHO, Geneva.
6 The ‘hockey-stick’ is not a technical epidemiological term, but rather popular short-
hand for a system that has gone past a ‘tipping point’ and is thus beyond control (see
Hinchliffe et al., 2013).
7 The Centre for Mathematical Modeling at the London School of Hygiene launched a
similar initiative (see: http://cmmid.lshtm.ac.uk/research/ebola/).
8 Because Ebola only spreads through close physical contact with very sick people or
corpses, its R0 tends to hover between 1.3 and 1.8. In contrast, for every one person sick
with measles, 30 can become infected.
9 The anxiety of African ‘traditions’ formed the baseline of a number of more refined
modelling efforts emphasizing funerals as superspreading events that could alone be
enough to sustain the epidemic (see Pandey et al., 2014).
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10 WHO press conference 29 October 2014 (retrieved from http://www.un.org/
apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=49196#.WVoj0hPyvNB).
11 GSK representative, personal communication, 29 September 2015.
12 For more on the methodological faith and fervour the RCT inspires see Bothwell
et al. (2016).
13 While MSF was involved in the latter stages of a vaccine research in Guinea, the
organization initially privileged their patient-focus and only engaged with research
into therapeutics (Rid & Antierens, 2017).
14 https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2015/t0414-strive.html
15 Jeremy Farrar interview 13 August 2015 with Global Dispatches (available from:
http://www.globaldispatchespodcast.com/page/18/?mc_cid=1ba374704a&mc_eid=
66e2f45cbf).
16 WHO High-Level Meeting on Ebola Vaccine Development and Financing, 23
October 2014 (http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/137184/1/WHO_EVD_
Meet_EMP_14.2_eng.pdf).
17 Initially this agreement was contingent uponMerck securing regulatory approval by
the end of 2017, a deadline the company has not met. GAVI, however, has indicated that
the filing delay will not substantially affect their arrangement (see Sagonowsky, 2017).
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